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PROF. GREEN: Good afternoon. I am Bruce Green. I teach
here at Fordham Law School.
This last panel focuses on an issue that has been touched on by
the other panels: the ethics and professional regulation of federal
prosecutors. This raises essentially two sets of questions.
One is the substantive set: What are the current understandings
of federal prosecutors' ethical responsibilities? What are the obli-
gations beyond those imposed by the Due Process Clause or the
Rules of Criminal Procedure? What are the obligations beyond
those undertaken by other lawyers? And how, if at all, have those
understandings changed over time?
The second set of questions relates to process: How are federal
prosecutors' ethical obligations enforced both internally and exter-
nally? What do individual U.S. Attorney's Offices and the U.S.
Department of Justice do to ensure that individual prosecutors
have an appropriate understanding of their ethical obligations and
a commitment to their ethical role? What do they do to monitor
prosecutors' conduct and to enforce standards of conduct? What
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do courts and lawyers' disciplinary agencies do? And how, if at all,
has the regulation of federal prosecutors changed over time?
To help us discuss these issues we have a very distinguished
group of panelists. First of all, we have two current high-ranking
government lawyers. Michael Bromwich is the Inspector General
of the Department of Justice. He spent many years both as a fed-
eral prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York and as an Associate Counsel for the Office of
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh. Mark Pomerantz is now
Chief of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York, having returned there after some
time in private practice and having previously been an Assistant
U.S. Attorney, and also Chief of the Appellate Unit there.
Then, we have three academics with a background in federal law
enforcement. Robert Precht, now at the University of Michigan
Law School, was formerly a criminal defense lawyer in a number of
contexts, including in the Federal Defender's Office in New York,
where he represented one of the defendants in the World Trade
Center bombing case. Rory Little, now at the University of Cali-
fornia, Hastings College of Law, was formerly both in the Depart-
ment of Justice and an Assistant United States Attorney in
California. Finally, John Barrett, now at St. John's School of Law,
formerly worked both in the Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice and as an Associate Counsel in the Office of
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh. So we have quite a range
of experience among the panelists.
I plan to conduct this session a little like my seminars, which is to
say I will throw out a question and then the conversation can go
anywhere it wants to, and I will not control it unless there is a lull,
in which case I may have to call on people. Because this is a panel
on ethics, I would ask people to be as honest as possible, and also,
to the extent possible, somewhat civil.
Let me begin with a very general question. It picks up on a
theme that ran through the prior panels. There is a notion that we
have all heard expressed about prosecutors' obligation to do justice
or seek justice, about the role of prosecutors as ministers of jus-
tice.' It is a notion that goes back more than 100 years in published
decisions. But we often think of it as having been originated by the
1. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. [hereinaf-
ter MODEL RULES].
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Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,2 which talked about the
duty of the prosecutor to refrain from improper methods and to
use only legitimate means to bring about a just result.3
We associate it with a speech given by Robert Jackson in the late
1930s, talking about how prosecutors' immense power to strike at
citizens demanded of prosecutors a spirit of fair play and decency.4
And, Mary Ellen Kris mentioned a little while ago the obligation of
fairness and integrity.5
The question is whether the duty to seek justice is more than just
a platitude for prosecutors. If so, what does it mean, and how is its
meaning communicated to Assistant U.S. Attorneys?
MR. POMERANTZ: I think it does have a meaning, and it has
a substantive meaning that translates into the small case by case
decisions that are made every day in our office. We do not view
ourselves as constrained only by ethical codes or case law or stat-
utes or the general requirements of due process. There is beyond
that the sense that prosecutors are supposed to do the "right"
thing. Of course, defining the right thing is trickier.
Starting with the general obligation, that is something that new
Assistants are told literally the day they walk into the office. I
meet with the new Assistants and tell them, among other things,
that while in our office they should never be in the posture of doing
something that they do not believe is the right thing to do; and that
there are many supervisors arouid who they should come and talk
to about anything that troubles them.
Apart from that, as case decisions .are made, they are reminded
all the time that their obligations in the way they do their job tran-
scend what the law requires. So if, for instance, there is a Miranda6
issue that has surfaced in conversations with agents, i.e. whether
there has been a Miranda violation, and the question is whether to
just call the agents who remember, perhaps wrongly, that Miranda
rights were given and not to call the agent who remembers clearly
that they were not given, we disclose that to the court and disclose
that to the adversary and the chips fall where they may on that
issue.
2. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
3. Id. at 88.
4. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 3,
6 (1940).
5. See Panel Discussion: The Federal Prosecutor's Role in the Regulatory Process,
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 711 (1999) [hereinafter Panel Discussion: Regulatory
Process].
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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There is not a formal training program, per se, but there is on-
the-job training that goes on every day and in every case.
PROF. GREEN: Jerry Lynch said this morning that he was an
Assistant U.S. Attorney for several years before he realized that
you did not have to indict every case that was handed to you. 7 Has
anything changed? As you described it, Mark, Assistants are told
to do the right thing and you hope that people have a finely cali-
brated sense of right or wrong and know how to translate their
God-given sense of right or wrong into everyday conduct in the
U.S. Attorney's Office. Is that enough?
MR. POMERANTZ: No. The voice of God is transmitted
through the Unit Chiefs. It is not just one's innate moral compass,
which may point in a variety of different directions. The degree of
supervision in the office is really all-important to those kinds of
things.
Written work is reviewed, for instance, during one's first year.
All written work is reviewed by supervisors. There are case re-
views. It is the day-to-day grist of the mill. The charging decisions,
tactical decisions, and decisions about how to handle every aspect
of the case are discussed constantly, one hopes - and if that is
uneven, it points out the importance of the hiring decision in some
respects.
MR. PRECHT: May I just comment on that? I regret introducing
perhaps a note of dissent in the general tone of today's proceed-
ings, but I think that is why I was invited.
Mark mentions the ongoing effort to teach prosecutors to do the
right thing, and we have heard a lot today about the need for train-
ing, and the need for sensitizing prosecutors. But I think, really,
we are facing a very different situation from the one we faced when
Bill Tendy started in this business.
I think some of the statistics are rather stark. We have heard
from a number of panelists today that the powers of the prosecutor
are at an all-time high. In Bill Tendy's day, they could affect plea
bargaining through charging decisions. Now the Guidelines have
given them substantial power to determine sentence as well.
At the same time, prosecutors today, an Assistant in his or her
first year, is, to an unprecedented extent, inexperienced in terms of
trial work. In Bill Tendy's day, The New York Law Journal re-
ported about three years ago that, a starting Assistant could expect
7. See Panel Discussion: The Expanding Prosecutorial Role from Trial Counsel to
Investigator and Administrator, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 679, 685 (1999) [hereinafter
Panel Discussion: Trial Counsel to Investigator].
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three to seven trials a year.8 That has dropped to one to three tri-
als per year.9 That is a sixty-six percent drop.
When Bruce asked what can prosecutors do, I think the key here
is to let the adversary system work, let defense lawyers work, be-
cause one of the chief ways for prosecutors to do the right thing, in
my view, is to stimulate the adversary system.
But what we have seen, really, is something that has actually de-
veloped into - and Jerry Lynch very eloquently detailed this1" -
an administrative system in which, not only do we have inexperi-
enced trial lawyers determining the fates of defendants, we have a
system in which there is no real cross-examination opportunity.
But if I had asked in many of these meetings I had with the pros-
ecutors, "Well, here is your paper evidence; would you please bring
in this eye witness and can I cross-examine him?" I would have
been sent packing. But we all know that cross-examination is one
of the best ways to reveal hidden weaknesses.
At the same time, it can be an utterly secret process. We have a
situation in which decisions are made behind closed doors and
there is no external mechanism to promote accountability there. I
think we are facing a very dire threat to our traditional notions of
justice. As a part of the plea negotiation, the defense is routinely
required-to give up any appellate right.
So I this is a very timely discussion, and I hope that, in terms of
thinking how to improve the system, we can think of ways in which
to stimulate the adversary system, because ultimately that is the
best safeguard.
It is a safeguard that ultimately redounds to the benefit of prose-
cutors, because if we have the closed system that Jerry Lynch
speaks of, and a fact-finding system, both of which are largely con-
trolled by prosecutors, that effectively excludes the defense and the
judge and the jury. Basically, we have concentrated not only the
fact-finding process in the hands of the prosecutors, but ultimately
the ethical responsibility to maintain the integrity of the fact-find-
ing process.
Of course, that responsibility was spread among several parties
in a properly functioning adversary system. I felt as responsible as
8. See Deborah Pines, Drop in Criminal Cases in City's Federal Courts, N.Y. L.J.,
July 27, 1995, at 1.
9. See id.
10. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
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a prosecutor did in terms of eliciting from witnesses weaknesses in
testimony. I can't play that role in plea bargaining.
PROF. LITTLE: I guess I will be the first one to say that what
Mr. Precht says is both completely right and completely wrong.
He is right, and Jerry Lynch is right, that the system is somewhat
of a pre-trial system these days. This is not so different, I would
say, than in Bill Tendy's time. In fact, prosecutors controlled sen-
tencing then as much as they do now, and more so, in that they
could pile on charges and there was no merging of offenses at time
of sentencing. Judges' discretion has been eliminated by the
Guidelines, but prosecutors' discretion has been limited too.
Now, that does not mean you can be devoid of ethical responsi-
bility. The biggest change in the regulation of ethics of federal
prosecutors is that when the voice of God used to speak through
Mark, thirty years ago no one questioned that that was the voice of
God. Today, the federal prosecutor is fair game for ethical charg-
ing, just like every private lawyer.
It used to be, quite frankly, that prosecutors had immunity, de
facto; they just were not charged. You cannot find reported bar
charges against prosecutors going back twenty years ago, except
for a very rare case. Today, it is routine to charge ethical violations
against prosecutors.
This is where I would take a little bit of spin off the "we have a
higher duty" position. It is absolutely true that the government
lawyer has a higher duty than the average lawyer. One reason for
that is that, constitutionally, they have to be the faithful executors
of the law.
Another reason is that they do not have a client. When you ask,
"Who is the client?" we used to reply in ethical training at the De-
partment: "Everybody is your client, including the defendant. It is
the People of the United States."
When that is true, your duty is higher. But your duty is not
higher in the reactive sense. That is the prophylactic sense - what
should you train, how should you act? In the reactive sense, which
is "what will you charge as misconduct by a prosecutor?" the rules
should not be different, unless there is fair notice.
The idea that the judiciary, the state bar, the Attorney General
or the Inspector General can create ethical obligations that were
not clear before the Assistant acted is an idea that should be very
controversial. The idea that not giving a particular type of infor-
mation in discovery that twenty years ago was not viewed as dis-
coverable - for example, impeachment evidence having to do with
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a prior act of discipline by a tangential government agent in the
case - is holding prosecutors to a higher standard in a retrospec-
tive way that is a dangerous process. I think it violates due process.
PROF. BARRETT: I think there is truth to what each of you
has said, but you are skirting the core issue. It is not simply the
defense attorney or the adversary process that will get the prosecu-
tor to do justice, and it is not simply some positive system with
notice, which is what I think Rory is describing.
It is some internal content in the prosecutor, himself and herself.
And that is the hardest topic to talk about, because we do not
know how to raise character. We do not know how to train judg-
ment. But we should at least be raising that question explicitly and
trying to have that conversation.
I think pieces of building prosecutorial character are all the ex-
ternal things that we have been talking about all day, including the
hiring, the training and the teaching; the assignment and rotation
system that is in a particular prosecutorial office; the role models,
such as what people see when they meet a Bill Tendy as they start
to work as a federal prosecutor; and the awards and the recogni-
tion that the Department of Justice gives.
But inside all of that is the internal human judgment that we
should be talking about here. We should be talking more about
things that people have touched on and hinted at. There has been
some talk of restraint and some talk of self-control, but I have not
heard anybody today use the word "mercy." I have not heard any-
body use the word "compassion." I have not heard anyone talk
about kindness. Obviously, in certain criminal contexts, those are
not particularly relevant, a certain quantity of violence and human
physical injury makes all the empathy in the world an irrelevant
consideration. But in a lot of what federal prosecutors do, we are
talking about things that are not quite that stark or quite that
injurious.
I think the balance that we really need to think about in terms of
doing justice is how we get those human qualities in the prosecu-
tors as they move forward, at least in a public corruption or a
white-collar context. Whatever label you want to put on it, that is
the question.
MR. BROMWICH: I agree with many of the things that John
has just said, and I certainly had the same experience that Mark did
when I came into the U.S. Attorney's Office and was told it was my
job to do the right thing and do justice. I took that seriously, and I
think most of my colleagues did as well.
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What I think the system may lack, particularly in busy urban of-
fices, is a continuing level of oversight and scrutiny over the actions
of prosecutors. As I review allegations of certain kinds of miscon-
duct throughout the Department, and during my tenure as a de-
fense lawyer when I was dealing with prosecutors as adversaries,
what I have noticed is a lack of monitoring and oversight. Not with
respect to new prosecutors, but as to prosecutors who have been in
the system for a while and perhaps get a little bit too comfortable
about being aggressive in everything that they do.
Keep in mind that when you are a prosecutor there is a tremen-
dous amount of pressure to be aggressive and to push the limit.
There is a tremendous amount of pressure that you experience at
the hands of investigative agencies. If you have only been a prose-
cutor for a year or two or three, you really lack the ability to rein in
some of the most aggressive instincts you see in the agents that you
sometimes have to deal with.
That is why I think that the internal regulation in individual U.S.
Attorney's Offices by prosecutors, by Unit Chiefs, by Criminal Di-
vision Heads, by United States Attorneys, is absolutely critical to,
not only setting, but maintaining, the appropriate ethical tone that
you want to be followed by prosecutors.
PROF. GREEN: Let me pick on that and ask the question a
little bit more concretely. What, if any, substance is there to the
general notion of the duty to seek justice? Let me put this in the
context of a contemporary case that people are pretty familiar with
in which a prosecutor has been coming under a fair amount of at-
tack for things which, I think, are essentially legal, but people feel
involve investigative over-reaching.
The alleged conduct includes putting people in the Grand Jury
for long periods of time in order to wear them down, trying to get
people to relinquish privileges that they may have, or generally be-
ing disrespectful of privileges, and intimidating family members in
order to convince witnesses to be cooperative.
Assuming these things are legal, but arguably involve over-
reaching, how do individual Assistants or offices think about
whether there ought to be some self-restraint in investigations?
PROF. LITTLE: One answer is in response to what Mike said:
there is a new ethical duty of supervision for prosecutors. This has
been a change within the last fifteen years. It is an ethical duty
both to seek supervision and to supervise. And, if you do not do
that, you are violating your duty to have a "do justice" mentality.
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One way those cases, or those tactics, need to be evaluated is as
a group, not individually. The day of the individual "cowboy" As-
sistant is gone. Assistants, prosecutors in general - all prosecu-
tors, including supervisors and fifteen-year veterans - have the
duty to seek out the advice of their elders, to seek out Bill Tendy's
advice if he is there; and Bill Tendy, similarly, has a duty to seek
out somebody else's advice and determine where these play out.
At some point it becomes case by case. That is, maybe certain
tactics may have been fair for Al Capone, but not fair for your
average citizen on the street.
PROF. GREEN: As you described it, you are widening the
frame from the individual Assistant all the way to the Assistant's
supervisor. There may be people who think that other lawyers
ought to be let in on this conversation, or maybe the public. Per-
haps the discourse about what is an appropriate or inappropriate
investigative technique ought to be a discourse that takes place
more broadly.
MR. POMERANTZ: But this is not a process that happens only
within the prosecutors' office and only in secret. It is a day-to-day
part of the process in which the defense bar and the court play vital
roles. A large part of the supervisor's job is fielding complaints
and appeals from members of the defense bar who do have
problems with individual decisions that are made.
Not infrequently, district judges call to alert our office to situa-
tions where they think individual prosecutors have over-reached.
None of that can substitute for a true and honest self-searching
process within the office. When mistakes are made, there is a post
mortem that occurs in well-run offices.
But it is a function of a lot of different systems coming together.
To leave the defense bar out of it is a big mistake, and to leave the
court out of it, or indeed the press, is likewise a mistake. Those are
all some of the checks and balances that function.
MR. BROMWICH: Your question is obviously a very timely
one. We can anticipate that, in the months and years to come, the
tactics that many prosecutors use will be subject to greater scrutiny
by the public, by the defense bar, and by judges, than ever before.
So, it is very important that the level of supervision and training
that goes on in U.S. Attorney's Offices, in the Department of Jus-
tice, and obviously in state and local prosecutors' offices, becomes
that much more important, because practices that were followed
when little attention was given to them now are matters of wide-
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spread public debate and will continue to be matters of public
debate.
Getting back to your original question, Bruce, in many cases it
comes down to a matter of proportionality: what is it that you are
investigating, what are the appropriate tools that you ought to be
using, and what are the appropriate lengths to which you ought to
go in pursuing justice and in pursuing your investigative objectives?
An individual Assistant cannot do that alone. It has to be done
with the aid and the input of both the immediate supervisors and a
broader range of supervisors in the office, for a number of reasons.
The most notable reason is that if you are focused on your case,
you do not have the perspective that you need to have in order to
make the appropriate decisions both in devising investigative strat-
egies and in deciding whether to charge.
MR. PRECHT: Bruce, there is another factor that is a danger to
prosecutorial decision making, and it is really one that people have
been generally speaking in too-favorable terms about, and that is
the increasingly close relationship between prosecutors and federal
investigative agencies.
I had an opportunity to go into prosecutors' offices during plea
negotiations and make my pitches, but invariably there would be a
DEA or an FBI agent there. As I was making my pitch, usually the
prosecutor and the agent would cast knowing glances at each other,
and when I left they stayed behind.
So, we have a problem that simply having the defense lawyer
present is not going to be effective. This is an anomaly where we
are suggesting that internal safeguards can be an effective regula-
tory device. In other words, everything in our history about poli-
tics indicates the importance of external checks and balances.
I think that has to be addressed because, as Jerry Lynch dis-
cussed in his article,11 prosecutors and federal agents view them-
selves as a team. Now, what implication does that have for doing
justice?
PROF. GREEN: The question of regulation raises two ques-
tions. First, is internal regulation adequate? And second, is there
any meaningful external regulation?
Let's start with the question of internal regulation. There is an
office in the Justice Department called the Office of Professional
Responsibility ("OPR"), which is supposed to investigate com-
plaints about federal prosecutors and mete out discipline. Until Ja-
11. See id. at 2128.
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net Reno became Attorney General, its investigative reports were
never made public. Now, I believe, they are made public
sporadically.
I have made a tremendous effort to obtain them, and obtained
some, maybe all the ones that are publicly available. That would
be an average of about four reports a year since they began to be
made public.
If you look at them, they do not look like the kind of investiga-
tions that prosecutors conduct of non-lawyers. They look essen-
tially like whitewashes. If you compare the decisions of the district
judges or courts of appeals that have referred these cases with the
decisions of the Office of Professional Responsibility, the distinc-
tion is quite stark.
For example, in the first case that became publicly available, the
district court found the government engaged in active misrepresen-
tation to the court regarding the existence of Brady material. 12 The
Office of Professional Responsibility found the prosecutor did not
intentionally disregard any disclosure obligation. 13
Another case in which OPR filed a public report involved a
money-laundering prosecution. The prosecutor implied in a press
conference that the money that the defendant deposited in the
bank was ill-gotten gain, when in fact the defendant deposited le-
gitimate income in the bank in small amounts so that his wife did
not find out in case of divorce. The district court and the court of
appeals found that the prosecutor's statements to the press were
"false, misleading, self-serving, unjust, and unprofessional. ' 14 The
Office of Professional Responsibility found that "[t]here was no ev-
idence to the allegation that the prosecutor made inappropriate
statements to the press."1 -5
I think, in general, the pattern is that the district courts find
wrongdoing, but they say it ought to be dealt with internally. They
refer the case to the Office of Professional Responsibility, but, at
12. See U.S. v. Isgro, 751 F. Supp. 846, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 974 F.2d 1091,
1099 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993), appeal after remand, 43 F.3d
1480 (9th Cir. 1994).
13. OFFICE OF PROF. RESP., PUBLIC REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF MISCONDUCT
ALLEGATIONS IN UNITED STATES V. ISGRO (1994), discussed in Bruce A. Green, Po-
licing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforce-
ment?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 86-87 (1995).
14. United States v. Aversa, 99 F.3d 1200, 1222 (1st Cir. 1996) OFFICE OF PROF.
RESP., SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION BY THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY INTO THE CONDUCT OF ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATrORNEY PATRICK M.
WALSH AND FORMER UNITED STATES ATrORNEY JEFFREY R. HOWARD.
15. See Aversa, 99 F.3d at 1200, 1222.
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least as far as the public record is concerned, there does not seem
to be any real meaningful enforcement.
I would start with Mike Bromwich, since you are Inspector Gen-
eral, and then anyone else who wants to pick up on this, and ask
about this issue of internal enforcement.
MR. BROMWICH: I certainly am happy to defend the record
of my office in individual cases that my office has done. I am obvi-
ously not going to address the individual cases that were under-
taken by a different office, the Office of Professional
Responsibility, the details of which I do not know.
I think it is vital to have internal investigative arms, like the Of-
fice of Professional Responsibility and the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral, because I think it is very important for the Department to
have the capability - and to be known to have the capability - to
do these investigations.
Now, my office is a fairly large office compared to OPR. We
have 450 people around the country. We have comparatively lim-
ited jurisdiction to do investigations of lawyers, and we do not do
the kinds of investigations of courtroom misconduct or Grand Jury
misconduct that you are really focusing on.
But for years, the problem for OPR was, and perhaps continues
to be, one of resources. They simply could not appropriately han-
dle all the many complaints that were coming in from defense law-
yers, and from judges even though there has been an increase in
the number of OPR staff over the last several years.16
It is obviously important that all kinds of internal affairs offices,
both OPR and mine, do a professional and objective job on the
investigations that they do undertake.
Let me just say, though, we have had matters that have been
referred to us by judges. With all due deference to Judge Martin
and some of the other judges who have appeared here, sometimes
the judges are just wrong in the findings that they make. We have
done investigations. In fact, we did a recent investigation involving
a presidential appointee where there were very serious allegations
made by a district court judge, and we did a very detailed investiga-
tion and we found that those charges were simply not supported by
the evidence.
Now, I am not saying that that is the case with respect to the
specific investigations that you have been addressing. But I do not
16. Attorney General Reno has nearly quadrupled the OPR staff in the last six
years. See Editorial, 'Win at All Costs': The Justice Department Responds, PTrs-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 3, 1999, at B1.
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think we should necessarily think that just because there are differ-
ent results reached by a district court judge after one kind of pro-
ceeding and then there is a finding by an internal investigative
body finding no blameworthy conduct, that that means necessarily
that the internal affairs arm has engaged in a whitewash. It cer-
tainly could be the case in some cases, but I do not think just by
holding up contrary results you have proved your case.
PROF. GREEN: I would not make the argument one way or
the other, but I would ask the question of whether there is not an
appearance problem. Doesn't the public need some reason for
confidence that prosecutors, of all lawyers, are being effectively
regulated?
MR. BROMWICH: Yes, and I think bringing more sunshine
into the process is terribly important. You are right, there have
been comparatively few OPR summaries that have been released
since the process began in 1994. But before that there was no pro-
cess at all.
Should more be publicized, and should the ones that are publi-
cized be publicized more quickly when there is still some interest in
the matter rather than several years later? I would argue that the
answer is yes.
PROF. LITTLE: We are seeing change over time in a positive
direction. There were not public OPR reports before. They had
almost no staff ten years ago. Janet Reno now has a regular de-
fense group that meets with the Main Justice folks once every two
months to get the perspective of the other parts of the bar. They
can put anything on the agenda they like. There have been
improvements.
Also, you need to compare this disciplinary process to the disci-
plinary process of lawyers in general, which many people have crit-
icized as being a whitewash since you practically cannot get
disbarred unless you kill your client, steal from your client, or acci-
dentally put three cents in the wrong account.
I would not for a minute suggest that that is a good reason to
close your eyes to problems among prosecutors, but there has been
a fair amount of progress.
I would like to say one other thing. Former prosecutors have
some obligation, in my opinion, to talk about the system when they
leave it, and to be critics to some extent. David Sklansky has a
piece coming out, in connection with this Symposium, where he
talks about the obligation of former prosecutors who join academia
to self-consciously critique it and push it forward. What Bruce is
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doing with exposing this sort of inconsistency between judicial
opinions and OPR opinions is a very healthy process, and OPR, I
predict, will react positively in the future. But it is a slow process.
There is no defense bar OPR. So when prosecutors worry about
what the standards are, they are higher in the Department than
they are outside, and that is a good thing.
PROF. GREEN: You mentioned lawyer discipline processes as
being another example of the fox guarding the henhouse. When
the Supreme Court, in Imbler v. Pachtman,'17 said that there is ab-
solute immunity of prosecutors from civil liability, they essentially
said, "But that is okay because prosecutors are susceptible to law-
yer discipline. 18
And yet, my reading is that there are very few public decisions
involving the disciplinary process and federal prosecutors. In those
few, federal prosecutors and their offices are kicking and scream-
ing, as in the case in New Mexico, for example, that the disciplinary
authorities ought not to have jurisdiction. 19
Do you think lawyer disciplinary agencies should be encouraged
to become a little more involved in overseeing federal prosecutors?
Why do governement offices resist that?
MR. POMERANTZ: Well, certainly to a degree, outside scru-
tiny by OPR or by the Inspector General is a good thing. It is a
question of degree. They catch cases that are really at the extreme
edges of misconduct.
The cases that worry me are not the ones that get referred to
OPR or to the Inspector General, or the ones that would be the
topic of review by an external disciplinary board. The ones that
concern me more are the excesses that are committed, not in the
high-profile cases, but those involving a poor mule who has no
funds to retain counsel or who may be represented by inept coun-
sel, where the case is not complicated and where the result goes
before a judge in a very quick fashion, and whatever over-reaching
takes place just kind of gets swept up in the system. It is trying to
figure out how to deal with that that I think is a bigger challenge.
The issues involving how to deal with cases involving massive
public screw-ups, like the ones that might well get referred to an
outside disciplinary committee, can probably be effectively dealt
17. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
18. Id. at 429 ("[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts
could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional disci-
pline by an association of his peers.").
19. In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992).
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with internally within the office or internally within the Depart-
ment. But I worry more about the ones that come in under the
radar.
I am not sure the answer is to try more cases. Trying cases is a
wonderful thing for a lot of different reasons, but I am not sure that
the main reason is to put the process into the sunlight, because
there are many public trials that take place in capital cases, for in-
stance, and the over-reaching by prosecutors or inept defense by
defense attorneys take place in full open view of a public court
room. It is not necessarily the case that public trials expose the
over-reaching that takes place behind the scenes.
MR. BROMWICH: I am not at all sure that giving more power
or expecting more of state licensing authorities is a desirable solu-
tion. My understanding is that state licensing authorities have
tended to be fairly sleepy entities over time, and the concern has
been that there is substantial political control that motivates them
in what they do. So, for a variety of reasons, we ought to be very
careful about wishing to yield more power to state licensing
authorities.
I also think the more remote you are from the process, the less
effective and meaningful oversight you can provide. That is why I
think the most meaningful oversight is within a prosecutor's office.
Beyond that, you move on to an internal investigative arm, like
OPR or the OIG, for certain kinds of cases. Once you get beyond
that, I think the effective oversight that you are actually able to
maintain is comparatively slight and we should not delude our-
selves into thinking that it is going to be a very substantial one.
MR. PRECHT: Let me suggest, though, a measure that could
enhance a safeguard that would be relatively painless, and we do
not need to go the full trial route.
In speaking to my former colleagues at the Federal Public De-
fenders Office here in New York, a recurring complaint is that the
U.S. Attorney's Office consistently requires plea agreements in
which the defense is prevented from making any argument for a
lower sentence than called for by the Sentencing Guidelines.
Freeing up that arena, allowing defense lawyers, on a routine ba-
sis, to make downward departure motions could breathe a measure
of individual justice into the process and stimulate the adversary
process. That would achieve many of the same results, as more
formal oversight would. But I do not think the U.S. Attorney's
Office is prepared to do that.
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PROF. BARRETT: I think Mark Pomerantz is raising an impor-
tant issue. We need to recognize that the pipeline that ends at
OPR or any of these formal internal review and disciplinary
processes we are talking about is a very long one. The serious stuff
might travel the whole distance, but a lot of other important stuff
might be located at earlier points in the pipeline.
How we get at that stuff? What we can do to solve these worries
regarding those cases is, however, implicit in the formal review
process model. Looking at prosecutorial behavior at earlier points
in investigations and cases, demanding explanations at those earlier
points, even written explanations, is something that any prosecut-
ing office is free to do with regard to its own personnel.
Bureaucratic requirements and documentation burdens are obvi-
ously unattractive to senior prosecutors who administer and super-
vise these offices. But, if a bold office that wanted to have the
reputation of doing justice crafted policy carefully, I think there is
room for policy-making that would get Assistants to offer explana-
tions for their various decisions at various moments of discretion.
And then you would have something, not only for the office to use
internally for self-government, but perhaps, if really brave, for the
office to put out on the street.
Now, that may be fodder for defense attorneys: "This guy got
mercy because this is how an Assistant viewed those facts. My guy
looks the same. My guy needs mercy too." But if the business of
prosecuting has all the high components that I believe it does, then
maybe that is the way to do it.
If you put it all out on the street, of course that information also
becomes fodder for attorney disciplinary proceedings, which brings
this back to Bruce Green's question. But the answer is also part of
Bruce's question. The "good conduct" bar remains the same for
public and private lawyers. I think the specter of aggressive bar
prosecution of government attorneys is just not that real. It
imagines too much energy in the bar discipline process. They are
not going to go after an AUSA disproportionately because they
really do not go after any attorney unless he kills and robs his dead
client. That is what Professor Green was pointing out.
PROF. LITTLE: Empirically, if you talk to state bar regulators,
they will say, not only it is a question of resources and energy, but
they also will say, "when we look at the prosecutor's office, we find
that it is better than most of the lawyers we are busy disciplining."
They are disciplining people who steal from their clients or who lie
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in court blatantly. They say, "we do not feel it is a good use of our
resources, even if we had it."
Talking about the changing role of the prosecutor is an interest-
ing change from just a short time ago. Last month, the last day of
the congressional session, on a voice vote acclamation, Congress
passed the McDade Bill, which says: "All federal prosecutors shall
henceforth" - to the extent they thought they were not - "con-
duct themselves in conformance with the state bar rules."20 But
that is an explicit congressional statement now, that state bars do
have jurisdiction over federal prosecutors.
The question is going to be how will that affect the future. Pros-
ecutors have to adopt a new role, which is ethical standard policy-
maker. That is, prosecutors really cannot afford to stand apart
from the bar any longer and say, "it's us, it's you." Prosecutors
need to be part of the bar process, they need to be on the discipli-
nary committees, they need to be forming the rules that govern
their conduct, or they must accept the consequences, which may be
discipline in areas where they never thought they would get it.
PROF. BARRETT: Getting out front also can obviate future
legislation like this McDade Bill, which is a disaster, if you have
looked at it. It, luckily, does not take effect for six months.21 But,
among other things, on the one hand, Congress is concerned by the
Singleton decision;22 on the other hand, it appears to have enacted
a species of it by this statute. To the extent that there are anti-
gratuity statutes in any state that can be read to prohibit rewarding
witnesses who cooperate with the government, those are now im-
posed on the federal prosecutors in that state by this new law.
Maybe all of this just proves John Lowenstein's observation, 3
that if they just moved first base a foot closer to home plate, we
would not have all those close plays. Legislation that passes on the
last day of a Congress is a bad thing.
But if the prosecutors' offices lead on these issues and have the
guts to air out some of these conduct questions, it perhaps keeps
the less-competent regulatory reactions from occurring.
20. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, § 801 (1998).
21. See, e.g., Otto G. Obermaier & Ronald R. Rossi, Evaluating the Crime Legisla-
tion Passed by the 105th Congress, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 26, 1999, at 1.
22. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 1999
WL 6469 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1999).
23. See, e.g., David Casstevens, Our Team, Our Park, Our Game, ARIZONA RE-
PUBLIC, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al.
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PROF. GREEN: Does the Act suggest a certain amount of
skepticism by Congress? Has anything changed in terms of how
Congress views federal prosecutors?
PROF. LITTLE: Judges were surprised by what they viewed as
an arrogant assertion of power by federal prosecutors in the Thorn-
burg memo and that whole dispute, which goes back to 1988 at
least, in the Hammad decision 24 here in New York.
They heard the idea that prosecutors did not have to play by the
contacts rule, when they did undercover investigations at least.
They heard that as a statement of, "we do not have to pay attention
to ethical rules that have been adopted by legislatures or policy-
making bodies, democratic bodies." I do not think the Department
ever recovered from that assertion of arrogance, which was really
not the message the Department intended to send, nor was it an
accurate translation.
Congressman McDade himself survived an investigation for
criminal conduct, and he had his own interest here.2 5 The idea that
prosecutors are arrogantly saying, "we do not care what the limits
are, we are going to go where we think we should go," is an offen-
sive one to most people.
MR. POMERANTZ: The problem, though, is that the cosmetics
have kind of obscured a real substantive issue that lurks behind the
controversial Hammad decision. The issue ought not be whether
prosecutors are subject to the same code of ethics that any other
lawyer is subject to is a real substantive issue. Ought a prosecutor
be able to contact a represented person in circumstances, for in-
stance, where the prosecutor has reason to believe that the repre-
sented person is obstructing justice or committing another crime?
That is the substantive issue that needs to be confronted.
It was done, at least cosmetically, in a ham-handed way through
the Thornburg Memo, which gave rise to the perception that DOJ
thinks its lawyers are above ethics and above the law. When the
debate is which laws and ethics should apply to the peculiar situa-
tions that affect prosecutors. These situations are simply different
from those that affect the private civil disputes that much of the
Code of Ethics talks to.
24. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
25. Congressman McDade was acquitted in 1996 after defending bribery and rack-
eteering charges for eight years. See Elkan Abramowitz, The Hyde Amendment and
Wrongful Federal Prosecutions, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 1998, at 3.
26. 858 F.2d at 834.
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MR. BROMWICH: The problem is thatthe substantive issues
are hard to summarize in a sound bite. What you had on the other
side was a concern on the part of members of Congress who were
the subject themselves of lengthy criminal investigations - and in
some cases, trials - that prosecutors simply had too much power.
They obviously had some sway among their colleagues. And some
of the subtleties that you are talking about, Mark, which are obvi-
ously true, simply cannot get aired out in the time available before
they had to pass the law.
PROF. GREEN: I am glad you said the substantive issues are
hard to summarize in a sound bite, because Rory and I both have
spent numerous pages writing about them. 7
But there are a lot of questions that are like that, where the dis-
tinctive nature of criminal justice and criminal prosecution suggest
that the ordinary standards governing lawyers do not apply in the
ordinary way to prosecutors. The analogies might be imperfect as
far as prosecutors are concerned. For example, lawyers are not
supposed to engage in dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresenta-
tion, but nobody would say that a prosecutor cannot instruct the
investigative agent to go out and pose as a drug buyer.
Given that there will be arguments on both sides, and it will be
hard to figure out exactly how the policy questions that you raise
ought to be resolved, by what process and by whom should they be
resolved: by the Justice Department by itself, by judges, by the
ABA, by some alternative group?
PROF. LITTLE: This is where what Rob was saying makes per-
fect sense. It has to be a broader process than just the Department,
both because of the myopia of a prosecutor's office and because of
the need for public acceptance of the goals.
I used to work on this Model Rule 4.2 debate all the time, on
contacts.2 8 If you say to the average person in a sound bite, "Do
you think the government should be allowed to work under-
cover?," they will say, "Sure." "Do you think they should be al-
lowed to contact a person represented by counsel without telling
their lawyer?" "Oh, absolutely not." It has to do with packaging
the issues.
27. See Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (1996); see also Bruce Green, Whose Rules of Professional
Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Cre-
ated, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460 (1996).
28. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1997).
1999]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
But you cannot form ethical rules without a consensus because,
even if you succeed in getting them, when they are applied in hard
cases they will not be accepted later. So it has to be a process
which involves the defense bar.
That is why I think a new role of prosecutors should be ethical
standard and policy-maker. They should attend the bar associa-
tions meetings just to get their two cents in. It is important.
PROF. BARRETT: To its great credit, the Department of Jus-
tice is now sending its people out to all these professional responsi-
bility, ABA committee drafting sessions. There are too many of
them, of course. The "Model Rule 4.2 issue" percolates currently
in about ten different fora. But the Department is now there, and I
think that is a good thing.
PROF. GREEN: A number of years ago, before he was a judge,
Jed Rakoff wrote an article saying that the prevailing attitude of
federal prosecutors toward criminal defense counsel was expressed
by a federal prosecutor who in the course of a rebuttal summation
implied that defense lawyers were professional prostitutes. 9 I do
not know if that is the prevailing attitude.
What is the attitude of prosecutors toward the defense bar?
What, if any, impediments are there toward bringing all these peo-
ple to the table - prosecutors, defense lawyers, other lawyers -
and trying to achieve some consensus on what the professional
norms ought to be?
PROF. LITTLE: Here is a good thing for Mark to add to his
first-day lectures. It is probably already part of the first-day lec-
ture. You say to the new Assistant, "The defense lawyer is your
friend."
Honestly, as a prosecutor, the most effective and helpful thing
you can have is a talented defense lawyer on the other side, even if
they are beating your brains in on occasion, because if they beat
your brains in a case before trial, you are better off having it hap-
pen then than at trial or post-trial, in my view.
So I do think there has been a hostility, a "we/they" mentality,
but it is not a healthy mentality. It is not effective in terms of
achieving the justice standards that, if you get them away from the
heat of the moment, most prosecutors really want to achieve.
MR. POMERANTZ: I dissent to a small degree. I do not think
that the degree of hostility between prosecutors and defense attor-
neys has grown substantially. Sometimes prosecutors do need to
29. Jed. S. Rakoff, How Can You Defend Those Crooks, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 25, 1990,
at 3 n.3 (citing United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1990)).
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be reminded - and they are reminded - that the defense attor-
ney is not the client and the sins of the client are not attributable to
the defense attorney. That is a dialogue that happens all the time.
But in terms of collegiality, of the ability of adversaries to work
together, the ability of prosecutors and defense attorneys to speak
the same language and to have dialogue vastly exceeds the ability
of civil adversaries to talk to each other without yelling, screaming,
and cursing. In part because it is a much smaller bar, in part per-
haps because I know, as a defense attorney for many years, there
was always the sense that when you walked into the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office you were kind of walking into the lion's mouth and
you want to behave yourself. But, for whatever reason, I do not
have the sense that relations between prosecutors and defense at-
torneys are anything near an all-time low.
MR. BROMWICH: I think one of the things that can prevent a
deterioration of relations between prosecutors and defense bars is
when you have people like a Mark Pomerantz or a Mary Jo White,
who have been defense lawyers and who are now prosecutors. I
think they do bring a perspective to their jobs that is different from
someone who has been a prosecutor all the way throughout his
career. I think it helps, almost subconsciously, build respect for the
vocation of being a defense lawyer in the eyes of many younger
prosecutors who are on the staff of such an office.
So, it makes a difference both in terms of the values that get
filtered down to the individual Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and also
in terms of the decisions that are made at the top that will, in fact,
affect those relations between prosecutors and members of the de-
fense bar.
PROF. GREEN: I wanted to return to a point that Mark raised
about post mortems. I have children and I teach them to learn
from their mistakes. To what extent do prosecutors, federal prose-
cutors in particular, learn from their mistakes?
Recently, there was a very high-profile case in New York where
a criminal defendant was convicted of murder, but it turned out he
was innocent and he was released after eight years in prison.30 The
prosecutor, an Assistant District Attorney, was asked, "What do
you say to this gentleman?"'"
This was his answer: "We live by an adversarial system. Our job
is to present evidence we believe is credible. The defense's job is
30. See Jim Yardley, Man is Cleared in Murder Case After Eight Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1998, at B1.
31. See id.
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to poke holes in it. In a sense, the system worked, although it took
some time."32
Is that generally a sufficient answer, or should prosecutors do
more to learn from their mistakes in cases that result in Rule 29
motions,33 acquittals, and so forth?
MR. BROMWICH: That is clearly not an adequate answer.
But to address your broader question, I do not think there are
enough post mortems that are done in U.S. Attorney's Offices or
other prosecutors' offices. I think there is a real urge and a ten-
dency, particularly in busy offices, to put the mistake behind you,
to try to console the individual prosecutor who made the mistake
or who got the bad outcome, and there is not enough of an ethic
and a culture of learning from one's mistakes by focusing on them.
I run an office that lives off other people's mistakes. I think we
would have less work to do if there were more of a culture, not
only in prosecutors' offices, but throughout the Department of Jus-
tice, that encourages figuring out what went wrong yourself before
some external body comes in. More importantly, this feature of
organizational culture would be useful not just to ward off the in-
trusion of an external body, but as a way of learning from mistakes
and of improving the quality of the work that is done in a particular
office.
MR. PRECHT: How are you going to catch mistakes? If you
have a regime where ninety-three percent of the cases are disposed
by guilty pleas,34 in which there is usually minimal court involve-
ment, and minimal investigation, how are you going to have the
generation of Brady material that we see in trials?
MR. POMERANTZ: You are going to catch mistakes in various
ways. You are going to catch mistakes if a case is Rule 29'ed, you
are going to catch mistakes that result in acquittals, and you are
going to catch mistakes because hard-charging defense lawyers are
going to bring them to your attention.
PROF. GREEN: What is the alternative, Rob? What would
you rather have - a system where there are no pleas?
MR. PRECHT: No. We cannot have that system, even if I want
it.
But let me give a situation in the World Trade Center case in
which, had it not been for the trial - and I think Michael can
32. See id.
33. FED. R. CRIM P. 29.
34. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Source Book of Criminal Justice Statistics, (visited
Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.albany.edu/source book/1995/pdf>.
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speak to this more authoritatively than I can - very serious allega-
tions regarding FBI misconduct would not have come to light.
Midway during the trial, there was still an important gap in the
government's case: they could not prove the actual contents of the
bomb. This was of some import because certain locations in Jersey
City had chemicals, but the government really could not connect
them up to the exact contents of the bomb. We hired a British
expert, who said it was impossible to find this because of the am-
biguous evidence.
But then, as the government was about to call its chemical expert
as a witness, a man named Fred Whitehurst stepped forward with a
letter in which he detailed very serious allegations, including the
fact that the principal examiner in the lab, who was responsible for
summarizing the dictation and preparing the scientific report in
that final case, pressured Whitehurst and other chemists in the lab
to slant their findings to favor the prosecution.
Now, not all those allegations were borne out, but I do not think
that they would have ever been revealed had it not been for the
trial. I think Fred Whitehurst, when he was about to take that
stand, there was a solemnity about being in a court room that
prompted him to really risk his career in coming forward.
I think we lose something very substantial when we go to an ad-
ministrative system that essentially hides these things.
MR. POMERANTZ: I am not going to comment on that par-
ticular case.
I will say, however, that it is certainly true that sometimes the
trial process exposes mistakes. But it is important to remember
also that it is the mistakes that go to trial. The fact that there are so
few cases that are tried is not a manifestation of the fact that
thousands of innocent people are being convicted without a
struggle.
It happens to be because most prosecutors' offices do a pretty
good job of weeding out the guilty from the innocent. When that
does not happen, or when mistakes are made, certainly trials ex-
pose them, and one does try to ask questions after the fact. We try
to do it also, not just in the trial context.
Whenever a nolle prosequi35 is filed in our office, we try to look
at it and understand whether a mistake was made, and if it is a
35. "A formal entry upon the record, by the plaintiff in a civil suit, or, more com-
monly, by the prosecuting attorney in a criminal action, by which he declares that he
'will no further prosecute the case, either as to some of the defendants, or altogether."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990).
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nolle because of insufficient evidence, at some point we try to ask
the question whether that case should have been indicted in the
first place, how it got indicted, and what mistake was made.
If it looks like a systemic situation, we will try to correct it on a
broader basis, perhaps, as we did recently, sending around some-
thing like an e-mail saying "be particularly careful when indicting
cases just on the basis of voice identification off wiretapped evi-
dence because that is not an infallible means of identifying who is
speaking."
It is a constant process of looking at the work of the office and
trying to figure out how you can do it better. Having said that, it is
something perhaps we do not do as much of as we should, and I
agree with Mike about that.
PROF. GREEN: What would you suggest that U.S. Attorney's
Offices do in addition to what they are doing?
MR. BROMWICH: I think making it a priority of the office to
in fact have an effective system of supervision so it is a defined part
of a supervisor's job, going all the way up the supervisory chain, to
provide post-mortem criticism and to engage in discussions with
Assistants when they have bad outcomes in their cases.
I think it partly is a function of time limitations, but I think a
concerted effort has to be made to focus on it as a priority and to
make the time to do it, because it is a very important thing.
PROF. LITTLE: You are not going to get approval for that sort
of thing until you give them immunity for their internal investiga-
tions. I mean, one problem U.S. Attorneys' Offices have is that the
minute they do a post mortem that focuses, say, on one of their
Assistants, they are afraid that file will go to the Inspector General
or to OPR and then be used as a club.
It seems to me you have to work out a system that says if the
office takes certain disciplinary steps or does a post mortem, they
can somehow do this freely.
MR. BROMWICH: Rory, I think they have that freedom right
now. I think that what we are talking about primarily are not alle-
gations of misconduct, per se, but failures and deficiencies, or
seeming failures and deficiencies, in performance, things that need
explanation, rather than allegations of misconduct. Those matters
U.S. Attorney's Offices, prosecutors' offices more generally, have
full authority to handle without referring them to one of the inter-
nal affairs components. So I do not think that is an adequate an-
swer. I understand there may be that concern, but I think it is
largely groundless.
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PROF. GREEN: On a slightly different topic - we mentioned
the World Trade Center bombing case, a fairly high-profile case -
a question might be asked about how the media has affected the
role of federal prosecutors.
Some might suggest, with all the press conferences and arguable
leaks and so forth, that prosecutors have been seduced a bit by the
opportunity of being in the media. I would ask whether there have
been changes in that respect, where are we now, and how does that
affect the prosecutors' ethical role?
PROF. LITTLE: You actually see more internal discipline now
for talking to the press than you ever did before. That is one prob-
lem, or one development.
MR. PRECHT: In the World Trade Center case, I very foolishly
appealed a gag order that Judge Duffy imposed. Looking back on
things, I think my ego got the better of me and I would have been
much better advised had I not opposed that.
But the issue in that case was not so much prosecutors and their
relationship to the media - and by that I mean leaking evidence
- because basically in the World Trade Center case pretty much
the government's entire case was leaked to the media before jury
selection. But it was not coming from prosecutors; it was coming
from FBI agents or other Agency personnel.
Actually, we have a very stunning recent example of that. Basi-
cally, during the World Trade Center case, one of the defendants,
who chose to speak to the prosecutors without a lawyer - it was
his decision - made a statement which incriminated one of the
pending defendants in the Embassy bombing, who is now under
arrest and awaiting trial, in a proffer session where prosecutors and
agents were present.
Now, the substance of that entire proffer session, which was a
secret, supposedly confidential session, was leaked to The New
York Times and appeared in the October 22nd story.36 We have
the spectacle of a World Trade Center defendant, who will proba-
bly never testify, never be subjected to cross-examination, incrimi-
nating another defendant who is now awaiting trial, and the
substance of that incriminating statement appeared in the media.
Now, I have no doubt in my mind that it was not the prosecutors.
This goes back, I think, to the problem of the extraordinarily close
relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement.
36. See Benjamin Weiser & Susan Sachs, U.S. Sees Brooklyn Link to World Terror
Network, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at Al.
1999]
762 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVI
So the real question is not so much - because I think the U.S.
Attorney's Office has been very responsible - how do we rein in
prosecutors, but how do we help prosecutors police that relation-
ship with federal law enforcement?
MR. BROMWICH: Well, it is a huge and old conundrum. I
mean, leaks have been around for a long time. I do not disagree
with you, Rob, that the leaks now are probably worse than they
have ever been.
As someone who has been responsible for conducting lots of
leaks investigations, they are horribly difficult to do. They are in-
credibly resource-intensive, and you very rarely find the person
who did it, certainly not with the level of proof that even ap-
proaches a preponderance of the evidence.
So it really is a difficult battle. It is, obviously, one that contin-
ues to need to be fought. People at the highest levels of our law
enforcement agencies, including the FBI Director and the Attor-
ney General, need to keep making the point that leaks are
unacceptable.
But I find this a very frustrating area because leaks continue to
happen. They seem, if anything, as I said, to get worse. And yet,
leaks investigations are horribly difficult to run and they rarely
succeed.
MR. POMERANTZ: Michael is completely right. They are a
source of never-ending frustration. In part, the difficulty is caused
by the extent to which - again without commenting on any partic-
ular case - but they are compounded by the extent to which diffi-
cult, large prosecutions are prosecuted by combined forces of
many, many different federal, state and local agencies.
Where our office might have some success is in dealing with the
FBI, where there has been a leak that we might suspect has come
from the FBI. It is vastly more difficult to clamp down on an
agency with which we do not have regular contact. We deal with
the FBI day-in and day-out. A different agency, which we may see
intensively only on a particular case, is just a much more difficult
problem to deal with.
MR. BROMWICH: The other point that we need to keep in
mind is that we have done a balancing of different values. The fact
is that we generally carve out fifty percent of the universe of peo-
ple who might be interviewed from our scrutiny, and that is the
reporters and the people who work for broadcast and print media.
We in our leaks investigations will contact reporters and hope to
get voluntary statements, but I can tell you - and it will not sur-
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prise you - that we are seldom successful in getting them to say
anything to us. And so, what we have is our investigative energies
only focusing on one side of the street.
The Department, and I think our society in general, has made
the judgment that allowing that information to get to reporters is a
better thing, all things considered, than cutting it off. And so, we
do not apply the same investigative tools to members of the Fourth
Estate that we do to our own personnel. That dooms you to fail in
most of these leaks investigations.
PROF. GREEN: Why is that? Prosecutors do not exercise a
great deal of investigative restraint in investigating drug dealers.
Does the prosecutor's duty to do justice require going easy on the
Fourth Estate?
MR. BROMWICH: No. There are rules in the Department that
essentially prohibit you from subpoenaing reporters. I do not re-
member what level it has to go to. I think it has to be approved by
the Attorney General, or somebody just below the level of the At-
torney General. So the Department has made a judgment - and it
is not a fresh judgment; it is a judgment that has been around for a
while - that it is not something that the Department wants to get
into the business of doing.
PROF. GREEN: That is a choice.
PROF. LITTLE: That goes to First Amendment values. It re-
ally is a balancing act.
MR. PRECHT: But it also goes to the difficulty, I think, of chal-
lenging federal law enforcement. I mean, how are you going to do
that? How are you going to go after valued investigators if it is
found that they have leaked evidence? I think this really goes to
the difficulty that you have in which prosecutors and law enforce-
ment see themselves as a team and how difficult, as Judge Martin
noted, it is for a prosecutor to disagree with law enforcement per-
sonnel, to turn that person in.
I think this goes back again to the lack of external safeguards.
Internal safeguards will get you only so far. It is the lack of checks
and balances that I think creates the real problems.
PROF. LITTLE: That is why you have an Inspector General or
an Office of Professional Responsibility that works. Mike
Bromwich has the hardest job in the world because no one thinks
he is their friend - except maybe a few people in New York so-
cially. But the positive value of that is that I do not have any doubt
that if the Inspector General actually identifies a leaker, if it was
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inside the FBI, they would do their best to discipline, or even pros-
ecute, that person.
MR. POMERANTZ: The closeness between the prosecutors
and the agencies can also be overstated. In contexts other than
leaks, the government and U.S. Attorneys prosecute agents and
police officers all the time, notwithstanding the fact that one has to
work with the same agencies and the same police departments on a
regular basis.
The problem is not that you do not want to prosecute an agent
who is working for you. The problem is you just cannot find out
who it is.
MR. BROMWICH: I would dissent a little bit from that, Mark.
I do think, particularly among newer prosecutors, rookie prosecu-
tors, there is a real eagerness to be part of the law enforcement
community and part of the law enforcement team.
I think there is a lack of skepticism, if you will. Lawyers are
trained to be skeptics. I think it is fair to say, as I think Rob has
suggested, that there is a failure to use that skepticism in challeng-
ing some things that law enforcement people do that might raise
questions in your mind.
I was guilty, frankly, of that kind of na'vet6 when I was a prose-
cutor. I do not know what all the reasons were, but I think that
there were some hard questions that I probably did not ask in cer-
tain cases that, in retrospect and with a decade or more of addi-
tional experience, I probably would have asked.
PROF. GREEN: Let me ask one last question, just to tie this
back to the theme of the day. When Mike and I were in the U.S.
Attorney's Office in Manhattan, Bill Tendy was exceptional for a
number of reasons, one of which was that he was one of the few
career prosecutors in that office.
Are people staying longer in the U.S. Attorney's Offices? Are
there more career prosecutors? How, if at all, does that affect the
issue of prosecutors' ethics and the other issues we have been
addressing?
MR. BROMWICH: My sense is that federal prosecutors are stay-
ing longer than they ever used to, both at the line assistant level
and at the supervisory level.
PROF. LITTLE: And does it have an impact on ethics? It does
in my experience, and this is reflective of what Michael said as well.
I have advocated for a long time that anybody who stays longer
than five years should go back and take a refresher course on the
U.S. Attorney's Manual and trial ethics and strategies, and even
PANEL DISCUSSION
technology. You have people who either believe they are too ex-
perienced to require that training, or they get lazy in their job.
You know, what happened in 1991 is that United States Attor-
neys became Civil Service protected and cannot be fired except for
cause. In San Francisco, it used to be the case that when a new
U.S. Attorney came in, most of the office left and they brought in
their own people. That does not happen anymore.
So I think it has a serious effect on the ethics of the office, not to
mention the fact that the world changes, and unless the older As-
sistants change with it, they can just be stuck in a different time.
PROF. BARRETT: That is right, but longevity only begins as a
danger. To close on an upbeat note, another way to view it is as an
opportunity. A pattern of attorney rotations would ensure that
people do not become entrenched in particular responsibilities.
And, if you can have a system of good CLE for prosecutors, then
perhaps a longer duration in an office gets the kind of expertise,
leadership and role models that are solutions for many of the
problems we have been talking about. The long-time prosecutors
who I worked with in the government were the people I learned
the most from - and not just in terms of nuts and bolts, but in
terms of the judgment issues that we are talking about. That just
comes with their age.
PROF. GREEN: On that upbeat note, let me close this panel by
thanking the panelists. We have benefited from an insightful, as
well as candid and civil discussion.
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